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In May 2008, Stanford University’s Center for Democracy, Development, and the 
Rule of Law (CDDRL) brought together 31 leading scholars and policymakers to 
discuss the reorganization of the United States government’s democracy 
promotion efforts. 
 
The purpose of the conference was to consider what could be done to improve the 
United States government’s efforts to promote democracy abroad. Participants 
were asked to assess various policy options and generate candid analysis and 
constructive recommendations about the potential options. 
 
This report summarizes many of the key arguments, suggestions, thoughts, and 
ideas that arose out of the two-day conference. It is offered in the hope of 
contributing to an understanding of current U.S. democracy promotion techniques 
and the options for improving upon these efforts in the future. 
 
The conference was conducted under the Chatham House rules. All of the remarks 
were not for attribution. Consequently, this report does not quote any of the 
participants by name. Moreover, the recommendations are not necessarily 
indicative of a consensus among the participants. Some of the recommendations 
had broad support; others represent some significant stream of opinion. No 
individual listed as having participated, however, should be presumed to have 
endorsed any particular recommendation. 
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PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN UNFREINDLY  
AUTOCRATIC REIMGES 
 
The United States uses several government agencies (notably the State Department 
through DRL, NEA, and MEPI, and USAID), as well as other entities with substantial 
government funding (including the National Endowment for Democracy and the Asia 
Foundation), to support democratization programs in unfriendly autocratic regimes.  
Despite the multiplicity of agencies and their varying degrees of distance from the USG, 
critics have charged that the recipients of these funds incur reputational damage and face 
real threats at home.  Some have been arrested. Others are denounced as CIA agents or 
lackeys of the Bush Administration.  Some reputable democracy and human 
organizations therefore have refused to apply for such funding, fearing retribution by 
local intelligence authorities or wanting to avoid the reputational costs associated with 
taking money from the U.S. government.  
 
This issue is not new, although the administration’s effort to promote democracy in the 
Middle East through MEPI, housed at State Department, has focused attention on this 
challenge.  Of course, no amount of bureaucratic reorganization will “solve” this 
problem.  But some configurations may be better than the status quo.  
 
Recommendations: 
1. Create a New Middle East Foundation/ Grow Existing Regional Foundations 
In place of MEPI, establish a new Middle East Foundation modeled after the 
Asia Foundation or Eurasia Foundation.  Once established, redirect all DRL funds 
earmarked for the Middle East to this new Foundation.  Funding for countries 
outside the Middle East could be channeled through already established regional 
foundations.  
o Advantages: 
 MEPI is in danger of losing its funding. Some within the State 
Department, as well as some advisors to current presidential 
campaigns, would like it to be closed down completely. Even if 
MEPI did survive a change in administration, the new leadership at 
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NEA might change the nature of the programming in ways that do 
not promote democracy. (Some believe that such a change in 
direction has occurred already.)   
 
 Creating an independent entity would insulate the foundation from 
these changes and also begin to cultivate a professional staff at the 
new foundation whose sole focus was democracy promotion and 
not other foreign policy issues that diplomats must also address.  
While this form of assistance would still be U.S. government 
money there would be more distance between the U.S. government 
and the recipients.   
 
 With financial support from the government but their own boards, 
staffs, and decision-making capacity, these kinds of organizations 
can be fully devoted to democracy promotion and not have their 
programs’ decisions tied up in trade negotiations or arms control 
agreements.   
 
 Over time, this new foundation could attract private funds as well 
as support from other democratic governments.  
 
o Disadvantages 
 A new foundation will encounter the same funding constraints that 
the already reestablished regionally-focused foundations now face.   
If funded as a stand-alone line item in the budget, rather than as 
part of the State Department’s total budget, this new foundation 
will have to fight for renewed appropriation every year. NED 
already exists.  
 
 Divesting NEA and DRL from the democracy promotion business 
will decrease the State Department’s attention to democracy issues. 
Eliminating DRL’s Human Rights Democracy Fund would weaken 
this bureau’s power and reputation in relation to the other bureaus 
in the Department.  
 
 The existing regional foundations focus on many issues beyond 
democracy promotion.  Some complain that they have softened 
their approach over the years in order to continue to work in 
countries like Russia and China.  Giving such foundations more 







2. Increase NED funding 
Instead of creating a new entity for the Middle East, simply transfer all MEPI 
and DRL funds to NED. 
o Advantages 
 NED already exists, has a well-established track record for 
delivering civil society assistance, and is not afraid to support 
human rights groups, NGOs, or democratic movements in 
autocratic regimes.   
 
 NED also already works in the Middle East.   
 
o Disadvantages 
 Beyond the four core institutions (NDI, IRI, CIPE, and Solidarity 
Center), other American NGOs in the democracy promotion 
business do not receive support from NED but do currently receive 
grants from MEPI and DRL.  
 
 In growing larger, NED might lose its unique style of operation. 
 
 Over time, the total budget for democracy promotion might 
decrease as it is easier to cut the budget of one organization rather 
than several.  
 
1. Create Regional Bureau Assistance Coordinators in the Department of State 
The way forward needs to be handled by Congress giving legislative authority 
to each regional bureau in the Department of State by creating “Assistance 
Coordinators” within each region. Each assistance coordinator would be charged 
with coordinating all policy initiatives in their region. 
o Advantages 
 This prevents the State Department from removing/ignoring 
democracy promotion objectives in any region. 
 
 This option also promotes the idea of pluralism and allows each 
regional bureau to create and implement a central strategy 
specified to their individual region. 
 
 By giving more authority to regional bureaus, the State Department 





 There is not a great deal of evidence that the core of people in the 
State Department have ever put democracy promotion as a top 
priority. Giving more power to the Department of State is a very 
risky and unrealistic approach to promoting democracy. 
 
 
2. Move All Funding for Democracy Promotion out of the State Department 
The more democracy promotion is tied to the U.S. government, the more we 
are tying our own hands. We now have many U.S. government entities handling 
NGOs and it is increasingly becoming a more state centered democracy 
promotion scheme. It is important to create distance between U.S. foreign policy 
and democratic transitions in foreign countries because it does not look right to 
have the U.S. government telling civil society groups in foreign countries to rebel 
against or question their own governments. One way around this is to move all 
funding for democracy promotion out of the State Department and encourage 
other facets of U.S. society to engage in democracy promotion. 
 Advantages 
 Friendly tyrants have become a big category of aid recipient from the 
State Department and this raises questions about the consistency and 
motivations of the United States government. Moving funding for 
democracy promotion out of the State Department would reduce 
skepticism surrounding the dispersal of democracy promotion funding.  
 
 When the State Department supports domestic groups for their own 
policy objectives, it can undermine the intentions and effectiveness of 
the domestic group. Detaching democracy promotion funding from the 
State Department would help domestic groups to maintain their 
credibility. 
 
 The State Department does not have mechanisms for learning much 
about domestic groups so they frequently hire U.S.-based 
organizations. Moving democracy promotion funding out the State 
Department would decrease the number of grants given to U.S.-based 
organizations and allow more funding to get to domestic groups. 
 
 It is not clear that State Department should be involved in giving out 
small grants for democracy promotion because it is ineffective at 
monitoring its grantees. Small grant funding should, therefore, be 
moved to an organization more capable of accounting for its grants. 
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 Our diplomats are moving away from the power of diplomacy and are 
becoming grants managers. Managing these grants takes away from 
the time diplomats should be spending connecting with people in 
foreign countries. Moving grants out of the State Department would 
allow diplomats to focus more on their diplomatic role. 
 
 We need more American organizations going abroad and working with 
their foreign counterparts. Moving democracy funding out of the State 




 It is almost impossible to separate U.S. organizations from U.S. 
money, even with programs like NED, because the money is still 
coming from the U.S. government. 
 
 We cannot remove the State Department from the democracy 
promotion equation because in order to be effective there needs to be 
some form of overall coordination. Without any authority or mandate 
there will not be effective coordination. 
 
 
3. Maintain the Status Quo 
o Advantages 
 Without the creation of MEPI, USAID and NED would not get 
nearly the same amount of funding for the Middle East that they do 
today. 
 
 The U.S. government has developed a micro-managing role 
because policy makers believe that these programs are important 






CONDITIONING DEMOCRACY (AND DEVELOPMENT) ASSISTANCE 
IN TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES: 
THE MCC AS A PHILOSOPHICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL SOLUTION 
 
Most of the countries in the developing world fall into the category of “transitional” 
whether measured in terms of economic development or democracy.  In 2006 Freedom 
House assessed 90 countries to be free and 58 to be partially free including industrialized 
countries.   These partially free countries are the conventional targets of foreign 
assistance, including democracy assistance.  
 
No assessment of democracy assistance can escape the sobering conclusions about 
foreign assistance in general.   Despite many billions of dollars and the sustained 
attention of thousands of PhD’s in the World Bank, academia and elsewhere, it is not 
clear that foreign assistance has done any good at all.  Some have argued that by breaking 
the relationship between a government and its own people, it has actually done harm.  
Our knowledge about what works in the area of foreign aid is woefully limited.  Past 
conventional wisdoms about the financing gap and human capital have not been 
supported by experience.  The argument that good governance is necessary for 
development has some but not decisive empirical support.   The recent enthusiasm for 
experimental designs by economists and political scientists reflects the failure of more 
macro-level analysis to provide compelling policy prescriptions.  If foreign assistance, 
including democracy assistance, was a company, it would have gone into bankruptcy 
twenty years ago.   
 
Just the opposite has happened, however.  Calls for industrialized countries to commit 0.7 
percent of their GDP to foreign assistance have increased rather than diminished.  Europe 
and the United States remain committed to promoting democracy.  The level of foreign 
assistance is going up not down.  Under the Bush administration it has more than tripled 
for the United States.   
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Thus, we are engaged in an enterprise with a noble purpose, promoting democracy and 
development, for which significant resources are available, and about which we have 
only very limited knowledge.  Under these conditions it is hardly surprising that there is 
disagreement about the right organizational structure.   
 
Recognizing these realities, the Bush administration created the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation.  The MCC was premised on the view that aid could not promote sustained 
economic growth unless a country was relatively well governed.  The importance of good 
governance had been substantiated by a number of studies especially by scholars working 
at the World Bank.  Moreover, some evidence suggests that aid does work well when it is 
spent in countries that are already on the right track.  
 
MCA/MCC funds are allocated on the basis of ex ante conditionality.  Countries must 
demonstrate their commitment to governing justly, investing in people, and promoting 
economic freedom by scoring relatively well on sixteen third party quantified indicators 
before gaining eligibility for assistance.  This emphasis on ex ante conditionality is 
motivated by the fact that traditional conditionality has not worked effectively in practice.   
 
Three of the six governing justly indicators are measures of democracy.  The 
administration limited its own freedom of action by adopting a transparent set of 
indicators over which it had no control as the basis for aid allocations (although the 
threshold program has permitted strategic considerations to enter the process to a limited 
degree).  The MCC also insists that potential recipient countries present a compact 
proposal for how funds are to be used and that the process for developing this compact be 
inclusive. 
 
A number of options were considered for housing the MCA including making it a part of 
USAID.  The decision to create a new government corporation reflected the 
administration’s reservations about USAID in general including its ability to manage a 
foreign assistance program that departed from conventional approaches.    
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The MCC got off to a slow start.  Congress, which had provided no year money for the 
MCC grew impatient, especially because funds were accumulating in the MCC’s 
account. The initial promise of a $5 billion program by FY 2006 has not been realized.  
The MCC is currently operating on $2 billion a year.  
 
Recommendations: 
1. Expand the MCC, even if at the expense of traditional development assistance 
programs administered by USAID. 
o Advantages 
 More than any other aid program in the world, the MCC has more 
successfully operationalized the view that sustained economic growth 
requires good governance. 
 
 There is a large body of literature in the social sciences, indeed all of 
economics, which suggests that incentives work.  In the area of 
democracy promotion, the lure of EU membership for many post-
communist countries offers a compelling example of this strategy.  By 
using ex ante conditionality, the MCC, has created an aid driven 
incentive program.  There is some evidence that countries are 
changing their policies to enhance their chances for MCC eligibility. 
 
 The MCC has not been as successful as it might have been because it 
is only a partial program and, therefore, does not have a great deal of 
leverage. Expanding the MCC would allow it to operate more 
effectively. 
 
 Conditional aid compels governments to listen to their citizens and 




 We do not know yet whether the MCC works; i.e. whether the 
provisional of non-trivial amounts of additional aid to better governed 
countries will increase levels of economic growth 
 
 The MCC’s evaluation process is ineffective for promoting democracy 
and development. The most significant problem is that countries are 
graded on a curve. If most countries receive very low scores, then the 
MCC rewards any country that is doing even slightly better than the 
rest. Instead, the MCC should hold all countries to high standards and 
only reward countries that meet those standards. 
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 The MCC’s evaluation process is not comprehensive and does not 
capture all the conditions for a transition to democracy (i.e. Indonesia 
has made significant improvements with democracy but those are not 
encapsulated in the MCC guidelines). The MCC evaluation system 
needs to be far more transparent. 
 
2. Expand the MCC principle of ex ante conditionality to all other assistance 
agencies, including most especially USAID. 
In addition, also expand MCC benchmarks to all other types of regimes, 
which receive US assistance, and not just threshold countries.  Economic aid to 
Egypt, for instance, would be conditional on meeting certain economic and political 
benchmarks. The benchmarks for non-threshold countries would be different (i.e. 
lower) but would still exist and would still tie the hands of assistance providers.  In 
short, make ex ante conditionality the main method of promoting democracy and 
good governance, cutting back on investments in traditional strategies of democracy 
promotion. It is not necessary for democracy to be a fixed condition for assistance. 
By creating conditions for controlling corruption and forming an independent 
judiciary, countries are going to find their way to democracy. Not having democracy 
mandated will make democratization happen much faster. In order for conditional 
aid to be effective, donors need to be willing to enforce conditions from the start. 
 Also consider leading an effort to make ex ante conditionality a guiding 
principle for other bilateral and multilateral aid agencies to ensure that the incentive 
for reform is a powerful one.  
o Advantages 
 Conditional aid will have the byproduct of setting standards for 
democracy and obligating countries to achieve them. 
 
 Unconditional aid is also at risk of getting captured by the 
government and never reaching those who it was intended for. For 
example, in Pakistan no aid has been used for political reform and 
only 1 percent has gone to development, while the rest has been 
spent on the military. Conditional aid will increase the likelihood 
that aid with reach its intended targets. 
 
 Conditional aid can be very effective when given by multilateral 





 Conditional bilateral aid is ineffective at stimulating reform 
because foreign leaders realize that the aiding country has more 
that one objective. For example, the leadership in Afghanistan has 
realized that the United States government cares more about 
keeping them in power than in creating democracy, so there is little 
incentive to reform. 
 
3. Continue to provide economic aid to strategic countries and weak failing states, 
irrespective of progress on economic development or political reform. 
This kind of assistance must be separated from assistance designed to 
achieve development goals. Perhaps an independent fund could be established for 
such assistance (both strategic aid and humanitarian assistance), housed at the State 
Department instead of USAID or MCC. 
o Disadvantages 
 Unconditional aid or aid driven by other reasons than development 
has actually done harm to people by entrenching in power 
governments that are not accountable to their own people (i.e. 
Museveni). Governments that get vast flows of unconditional aid 
are freed from their obligations to their own people.  
 
4. Shut down the MCC experiment.  
At a minimum make it clear that MCC is not designed to  
promote democracy. 
o Advantages 
 It is not clear that the MCC is effective. For example, a number of 
countries that originally met the MCC requirements have since fallen 
below the standards after receiving MCC aid. 
 
 MCC funds are not always used to promote democracy and 
development. The MCC does not focus strictly on its development 
standards and its funds are sometimes used to promote U.S. policy. 
This is exacerbated by the fact that many ambassadors are not 
interested in promoting democracy. 
 
5. Maintain the Status Quo 
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REFORMING CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
After more than two decades of assisting civil society abroad, the relationship between 
this foreign assistance and democratic development is still poorly understood.   A most 
extensive survey by Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson (2007) has identified a statistical 
relationship between USAID expenditures on democracy and governance on the one 
hand and democratic development around the world on the other. For those in the 
democracy promotion business, this is good news. Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson also 
discovered some sub-sectoral correlations between assistance and outcomes, finding that 
a positive relationship exists between USAID spending on elections, civil society, and 
governance on the one hand and these sectors in developing democracies on the other, 
but a negative relationship exists between spending on  USAID spending human rights 
and democratic development.  Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson, however, do not 
breakdown sub-sectoral spending, and therefore have no evaluation of which kinds of 
civil society programs work better than others. Regarding impact, most qualitative studies 
done at the sub-sectoral level or looking at only one dimension of these sub-sectors (i.e. 
assistance to women’s organizations or environmental groups rather than civil society as 
a whole) are much more critical. 
 
In addition to not having good assessments, the USAID bureaucracy for providing civil 
society has grown considerably.  In a typical country, a D&G director overseas four sub-
sectors.  Each subsector has a program officer, including one for civil society. This 
program officer monitors an “implementer”, which in the case of civil society 
development, is often a contractor that provides small grants.  This contractor then 
provides the direct assistance to the local NGOs. All of these activities are monitored by 









1. Establish better assessment procedures. 
A new institute or mandate to implement more effective evaluation 
procedures should be established within the State Department. More effective 
assessment procedures will help to increase knowledge and expertise in the areas of 
democracy and development. In addition, the creation of new evaluation procedures 
would help to end the practice of USAID contractors receiving contracts to evaluate 
USAID programs.  
o Advantages 
 While both USAID and the State Department have preformed 
democracy promotion evaluations in the past, thus far their 
assessment processes have been highly inconsistent. Without 
common performance evaluation systems, there is no way to 
effectively compare programs or develop program expertise. By 
creating more consistent assessment procedures both USAID and the 
State Department can hope to gain greater expertise in the area of 
democracy promotion in order to more effectively promote 
democracy abroad. 
 
 These organizations are spending taxpayers money and they should 
be accountable for how that money is being spent. 
 
 USAID has already preformed a variety of Democracy and 
Governance assessments, however, it has not done a good job of 
getting these assessments out to the broader public. Improved 
assessment procedures would ensure that such evaluations are better 
distributed and analyzed. 
 
o Disadvantages 
 Those in the democracy promotion business are already very risk 
averse. No one wants to fail or find something that doesn’t work 
because they are afraid that they will be penalized, so people do not 
experiment. Creating stricter evaluation procedures will only further 
decrease innovation and risk taking.  
 
 
2. In place of USAID offices overseeing civil society development, move to a 
foundation model.  
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A foundation for civil society development would be established in 
Washington, with branches/partners in all countries where the United States 
currently provides civil society assistance.  This new foundation would receive direct 
funding from the United States government, but act independently from USAID or 
the State Department. This new Civil Society Foundation would makes grants both 
to local NGOs and to American NGOs in the business of providing assistance to 
civil society. 
In parallel, a new institute for evaluation would be established, either as a 
stand alone organization in Washington or as part of a university.  The creation of an 
evaluation institution dedicated solely to evaluation would help to end the practice of 
USAID contractors receiving contracts to evaluate USAID programs. Without more 
effective assessment procedures it will be very difficult to establish any expertise in 
these areas. 
o Advantages 
 We need to move away from a government centered democracy 
promotion scheme. Right now, the U.S. government is very 
involved in the implementation process and the handling of NGOs, 
and this is undermining the effectiveness of democracy promotion 
efforts. 
 
 This new structure would create more distance between the U.S. 
government and democratic assistance activities. (It is a paradox of 
current US democracy promotion efforts that a single government 
entity – USAID – provides the lion’s share of assistance to civil 
society.  When a foreign government tries to play this role – say 
the Russian government today – we call it undemocratic as the 
Russian government funding blurs the lines between state and 
society.) 
 
 This new structure would also eliminate the practice of the U.S. 
government provided direct assistance to the non-governmental 
sector in foreign countries, a practice that many governments find 
unethical and a violation of their sovereignty.  USAID would still 
be responsible for all direct assistance to government institutions, 
including parliaments, election commissions, courts, and 
presidential administrations.  Having this separation would 
eliminate the strange circumstance of having the same D&G office 
funding one government office that is at odds with a civil society 
organization also funded by the same D&G office (i.e. providing 
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technical assistance to a central election commission at the same 
time as providing funding to civil society organization trying to 
monitor elections). 
 
 Over time, this new structure would cultivate greater professional 
expertise in civil society development.  Whole career could be 
spent in this new foundation’s structure. 
 
 This new structure would eliminate a lot of the overhead now spent 
in maintaining the current chain of intermediaries. This new 
structure also would create more direct contacts between those 
Americans who are designing civil society programs and those in 
foreign countries who are supposed to be benefiting from this 
assistance. 
 
 Democracy promotion is more effective when it is pursued from a 
bottom-up rather than top-down approach. A foundational model 
for democracy promotion would support a more bottom-up 
approach to democracy promotion. 
 
 This new structure would protect direct assistance to NGOs from 
the ups and downs of U.S, foreign policy. When the White House 
decides to cut foreign assistance to a country to change its behavior 
at home or abroad, U.S. funds earmarked to promote democracy 
through nongovernmental actors must not be part of the 
conditionality. 
 
 Democracy promotion is starting to be seen as a U.S. government’s 
niche and private foundations and individuals are starting to stay 
away from it. A foundational model would increase private 




 The argument that USAID maintains excessive control over civil 
society funding is flawed. First, USAID is only the donor, not 
necessarily the provider or implementer in many cases. Second, the 
United States government has system and procurement 
mechanisms such as grants and cooperative agreements that largely 
separate the money from operational decision making. This allows 
implementers like Freedom House, IRI, NDI to essentially 
maintain effective control over their programs and maintain a high 
degree of independence. When making grants there is always a 
tradeoff between control and oversight on one hand and 
independence of democracy promoting NGOs on the other. While 
greater independence for NGOs and civil society groups may be 
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desirable, it is important to recognize the realities of such a 
tradeoff.  
 
 This new foundation structure would compete with existing 
foundations already doing similar kinds of activities (i.e. Asia 
Foundation, Ford Foundation, NED).  At the same time, this 
already occurs. 
 
 Two structures – the current USAID office in country X and the 
new foundation in the same country – might create more overhead 
expenses, not less. 
 
 USAID would be weakened considerably by losing control of this 
portfolio. 
 
 Creating a civil society foundation would undermine the political 
dimension of these groups and make them far less effective. 
 
 There is no need for yet another assistance organization. 
Proliferation of democracy promotion institutions will only break 
down efficiency and coherence. What is needed it better 
coordination between the departments that already exist (i.e. 




3. Mandate that all USAID assistance earmarked for civil society support be provided 
through “Assistance Mechanisms” (grants and cooperative agreements) and not 
“Acquisitions Mechanisms” (contracts). 
The latter, in essence, makes the contracting organization or company an 
implementer of U.S. government policy.  The NGO or company receiving these 
funds is executing a USAID plan and not providing any strategic input.  In some 
sensitive political situations, this form of direct assistance can make the recipients 
of USAID assistance look like collaborators or agents of the U.S. government.  
The Assistance Mechanism provides greater autonomy from the U.S. government 
and also leverages more effectively the expertise of the American NGOs 
receiving the funds. 
The revolving door between USAID and contractors must be broken. 
Former USAID employees should not be allowed to bid on or execute USAID 
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contracts for two years after leaving the U.S. government. Companies and NGOs 
that implement USAID programs cannot also accept USAID contracts to evaluate 
USAID programs.  
To strengthen the place of democracy promotion within USAID, establish 
a Deputy Administrator for Democracy and Governance.  In so doing, the current 
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance should be 
restructured to separate its Democracy and Governance sector from its 
Humanitarian and anti-Conflict sectors. Since Humanitarian Assistance and anti-
Conflict are so central to much of what USAID does (and are the reason for the 
de-emphasis of Democracy and Governance in the first place), this separation 
would help to create a more focused and prioritized approach to democracy 
promotion within USAID. 
In most cases, for profit companies should not be allowed to bid to do civil 
society assistance work. 
For civil society work, stop the practice of bundling aid projects into a 
single cooperative agreement and move away from Indefinite Quantity Contracts 
(IQCs).1  
o Advantages 
 In many situations, contracts and funding go to large for-profit 
organizations that speak English and know how to write appealing 
proposals. Because of this, smaller local NGOs are frequently 
overlooked. Creating an organization to deal specifically with 
NGOs would ensure more funding for innovative local 
organizations. The State Department and USAID need to move 
away from providing funding through contracts and focus on 
distributing funding though grants in order to better support 
innovative local NGOs.  
 
 Less reliance on for-profit contracts would reduce excess spending 





                                                 
1 For details on this practice, see “ACVFA’s Analysis and Recommendations of Trends in USAID 




IMPROVING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE TO NEW DEMOCRACIES:  
THE “F” PROCESS 
 
The current organizational structure for foreign assistance is a hodge-podge.  There are 
nineteen different foreign assistance accounts in State and USAID.  There are twenty 
different agencies that have some kind of foreign assistance programs.  Lines of authority 
are blurred.  The Administrator of USAID, for instance, reports to the Secretary of State, 
but both the Administrator and the Secretary are members of the MCC Board of 
Directors.   
 
This organizational jumble reflects: (1) accretion over time with different administrations 
having different priorities; (2) pressure from societal interest groups whose commitments 
are almost always to specific functional activities such as education, humanitarian 
assistance, and treatment for AIDs; (3) the specific concerns of some members of 
Congress and; (4) the absence of compelling evidence about what works and what does 
not. 
 
This organizational jumble has had a variety of negative consequences. Perhaps, most 
importantly, it has stood in the way of coherence in the use of development assistance as 
a tool of U.S. foreign policy.  More concretely, with resources spread so widely, the main 
vehicle for U.S. development assistance, USAID, has seen its professional competencies 
eroded, its budgets cut, and its authorities parceled out across the U.S. government. 
 
The F process was an effort to bring greater coherence to foreign assistance activities 
within State and USAID and to give the Secretary of State greater de facto control over 
the foreign assistance process.  The Secretary created a new office, the Director of 
Foreign Assistance (DFA), using her existing authorities.  The Director of Foreign 
Assistance (F) was also to serve as the Administrator of USAID.  While the DFA is not a 
Senate confirmed position, the Administrator of USAID is.    
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The creation of the DFA was as much a political judgment as an organizational one.  
Anything organizationally more ambitious with regard to coordinating foreign assistance 
throughout the USG would have required new legislation, and possibly a revision or 
scuttling of the Foreign Assistance Act.  A re-organization of the foreign assistance 
accounts would also have required major new legislation.  No one believed that such 




1. Let a thousand flowers bloom (tweak the status quo).   
Although governments like organizational clarity, or at least the 
appearance of organizational clarity, democracy promotion and foreign assistance 
in general may be an area where different actors operating with different views in 
different agencies might be the best that we can hope for.  As Easterly and Rodrik 
have argued, development paths are idiosyncratic.  Success is most likely to come 
from the bottom up, often in unexpected ways.   In any event, international donor 
coordination is a chimera given different national approaches to assistance, 
differences that reflect the domestic characteristics of donors more than the needs 
of the countries to which assistance is directed.  The jumble of agencies, 
government corporations, external contractors, and NGOs engaged in supporting 
democracy may work better than a more structured, coordinated, and coherent 
system whose programs might map well on to some countries but badly on to 
others. 
o Advantages 
 Having multiple players in a field creates competition and 
stimulates innovation. 
 
 We don’t always know what is going to work best in a certain 
region at a certain time. Having multiple organizations doing 
different things at different paces can help us understand what 




 Creating more organizations will only make an already 
disconnected process more disorganized. 
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 Some competition is good, but too many organizations will 
decrease overall coherence and will create strains on recipient 
countries, especially those with low state capacity. 
 
2. Create a More Coordinated Structure 
Within State and USAID this would mean further strengthening the F 
process, possibly turning the DFA into a second Deputy Secretary at State.  
Beyond State and USAID it would entail either moving some foreign assistance 
programs now in other agencies into the State Department or creating a cabinet or 
sub-cabinet agency that would have authority over most if not all existing 
programs. Any effort to create a more integrated and coordinated structure would 
require re-writing the foreign assistance act.  Given that we have to admit that we 
do not really know what we are doing, would this be worth the effort?  
o Advantages 
 The F process takes the sensible approach of attempting to 
associate different assistance programs to general country 
characteristics.  Security assistance that could be most useful 
for a post-conflict country, for instance, would be inappropriate 
for a transformational or MCC eligible country.  However, the 
nineteen foreign assistance accounts do not map neatly on to a 
strategy that associates different kinds of aid with different 
country characteristics. By revising the account structure it 
would be possible to better align funding with needs.  
 
 
3. Create a Deputy of Democracy and Development to the Secretary of State.  
The Deputy of Democracy and Development would oversee all democracy 
and development projects and report directly to the Secretary of State. 
o Advantages 
 Creating a Deputy of Democracy and Development would 
establish a niche for democracy and development in the State 
Department. It would also ensure that democracy and 
development funding was not subject solely to the whim of the 
Secretary of State.  
 
4. Increase USAID funding and oversight. 
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Increase USAID’s ability to do what it has always done. Currently, 
USAID has a very wide infrastructure and significantly under resourced. It could 
become far more efficient with increased funding and personnel. In addition, 
USAID should be expanded to include development work. USAID has done 
development work in the past, and with more money and authority it could very 
successful in this area. There should also be a specific area for democracy 
promotion within USAID in order to ensure that it is not overlooked within the 
organization. 
o Disadvantages 
 USAID has not established effective evaluation procedures. 
Before USAID should be expanded it should develop more 
expertise and a better system of accountability.  
 
5. Return to Status Quo Ante 
Eliminate the position of Director of Foreign Assistance at the State 
Department, return AID’s strategic planning back to USAID, and bolster D&G 
within USAID, i.e. create a Deputy Administrator for Democracy and 
Governance.   
 
6. Maintain the status quo. 
o Advantages 
 Despite much gnashing of teeth and beating of breasts in both 
USAID and State, the F process has provided greater 
coherence.  It does offer the Secretary of State the opportunity 
to make judgments about allocations among regions, and 
within regions, among countries.   
 
 It is important to make sure that taxpayer money is being used 
to the best of our ability. The “F” process provides the 
Secretary of State with greater de facto control over the foreign 
assistance process in order to facilitate the efficient use of 
funding. 
 
 The F process benefits USAID because it allows USAID to 
have far more influence over the State Department budget than 
it has had in the past. Because of this, development has been 
prioritized in the State Department and it receives far more 
attention and funding.  
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 In the past, there has been a serious information gap between 
USAID and the Hill. The F process has helped to bridge this 
gap and give USAID a greater voice in the executive branch. 
 
 It is important to have connection between the Secretary of 
State and USAID because it is difficult it is difficult to 




 As some have pointed out, the process of creating integrated 
multi-year country programs has been rocky.  The level of 
guidance that Washington should provide to embassies and the 
ability of embassies to craft programs is not settled. 
 
 The F process has had very negative effects on issues of 
flexibility. Having the government implement more restrictions 
on NGOs means that little organizations have to spend more of 
their time and money on meeting those requirements. This 
makes smaller NGOs more susceptible to getting squeezed out 
by larger companies who can withstand the costs associated 
with more requirements.  
 
 It is possible to have an organization that has good oversight 
and it not part of the executive branch. NED thrives because it 
is not part of the executive branch. 
 
 When the F process was implemented, a lot of USAID 
personnel were transferred to the State Department and USAID 
lost a lot of its brainpower. Having the USAID administration 
spending most of its time at the State Department has greatly 
undermine the capacity of USAID.  
 
 The F process is an unnecessary formality. The USAID 
administration could still report to the Secretary of State and 
have influence over the State Department’s budget without the 
F process.  
 
 Allowing the Secretary of State to have so much control over 
development funding is a serious risk because we do not know 
how he/she will prioritize this responsibility. The F process 
may seem like a positive development under our current 
Secretary of State, however, we can’t guarantee that the next 
Secretary of State will be as invested in promoting democracy 
and development. 
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MAKING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION WORK IN CONFLICT AND POST-
CONFLICT COUNTRIES 
 
The imperatives of peace and security in the 21st century mean that the promotion of 
democracy via security assistance to states in post-conflict situations has grown in the 
past decade as an area of policy and shows every indication that it shall grow further in 
the years to come. This phenomenon has been driven by the increase in the number of 
countries with poor and worsening indicators of governance, the persistence of limited 
democracies or disguised autocracies at the end of the third wave, and the ongoing 
internal security challenges produced by insurgencies, terrorism, and other illicit actors.2 
It is also a product of the increased concern among policymakers over long-standing but 
previously ignored cases of poor governance. This concern among policy-makers over 
the fate of democracy arises in part out of a perception that globalization has triggered 
new connections and caused spillover between the problem cases and the well governed 
parts of the international community. There is also the belief in certain parts of the policy 
community, particularly in the United States, that poorly governed spaces in post-conflict 
states are breeding grounds for nefarious actors and illicit power structures.3  
 
There are clearly many cases where democracy assistance and security cooperation in 
post-conflict states have worked, beginning with the reconstruction of West Germany, 
Italy and Japan after WWII. More recently, we have witnessed the peace settlements and 
democratization of Central America in the 1990s, and after many painful false starts, the 
states emerging from Yugoslavia as well as the more successful record in central and 
Eastern Europe connected to the enlargement of NATO. During this period, a substantial 
public/private industry has grown up around providing assistance, ranging from direct 
government-to-government programs, to aid and advice from international agencies and 
                                                 
2  “The Failed States Index,” Foreign Policy 161 (July/August 2007). Accessed on 15 January 2008 
at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3865&page=0. 
3  Karen DeYoung, “World Bank Lists Failing Nations That Can Breed Global Terrorism,” The 
Washington Post, 15 September 2006, A13. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, 
Ungoverned Areas and Safe Havens, Developed by Robert Lamb for the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy through the Ungoverned Areas Project, an interagency project managed by the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, Department of Defense, Washington DC, January 2008. 
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non-governmental organizations, to private contractors executing assistance programs at 
the behest of government agencies. In spite of these efforts, there are a number of critical 
cases suffering from ongoing conflicts that, despite receiving truly astounding levels of 
international assistance, nonetheless continue to exhibit some combination of persistent 
poor governance, limited democratization, and ongoing internal security challenges.  
Such cases as Pakistan, Colombia, Afghanistan and Iraq are only the most newsworthy 
examples, but any number of other conflict/post-conflict countries are quietly and 
persistently misgoverned despite the best efforts of the assistance/donor community.  
 
A skeptic might suggest that all the ‘easy’ cases for democracy and security assistance to 
post-conflict states have been taken care of since World War II,4 leaving only the cases 
for which there are no easy answers or solutions. This generalization is particularly 
applied to post-conflict settings, countries with politicized ethnic or cultural cleavages, 
nations in unstable or threatening regional environments, or those perceived by some as 
being saddled with democracy-resistant cultures. We should all keep in mind that several 
of the major success stories in democracy and security assistance occurred in 
environments characterized by significant external threats and low internal threats. In the 
wake of the end of the Cold War, changes in the structure of the international system 
have brought internal security threats to the forefront while external threats have receded. 
The provision of democracy and security assistance under such conditions is more 
complex and politically controversial for both donor and recipient states. In addition, 
certain provider nation-states seem to have embraced a “less is more” approach in the 
wake of 1989, which contrasts with the comprehensive efforts of the era of the Second 
World War and the early-Cold War. So the problem may not lie simply with the inability 
of donor states to organize the appropriate policy responses, rather, there may be cases 
that are simply structurally resistant to outside assistance and intervention. 
 
                                                 
4  Such a contemporary view ignores how difficult the fate of the ex-Axis countries were in the 
context of the years 1944-1950, and how many contemporary observers doubted that Allied efforts there 
would eventuate in anything other than a repeat of the inter-war disasters.  The celebration of success is a 
generalization that only took hold years, if not decades later.  
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Recent research in social science on post-conflict transitions highlights a number of 
important empirical regularities that can inform how we think about the proper place of 
democracy promotion in post-conflict transitions: 
 
• First, decisive victories tend to yield more sustained periods of peace than 
negotiated settlements (Licklider 1998; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Toft 2007; 
Fortna 2008). Decisive victories are often quite undemocratic (as we have seen in 
recent history in Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, for example), but often produce 
security for the population and resume the effective delivery of social services.  
 
• Negotiated settlements, especially when they are accompanied by peacekeeping 
operations, can also lead to periods of peace, although UN operations need to be 
extensive and sustained to make a difference (Walter 1997; Doyle and Sambanis 
2006). But negotiated settlements tend to involve power-sharing arrangements, at 
least in advance of the first election, which are prone to a host of pathologies 
(Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Power-sharing arrangements tend to empower 
ethnic elites, encourage the continued escalation of claims (for positions and 
resources), and are hard to maintain as the incentives to defect from them increase 
over time. They seem, at first, to be a reasonable strategy for stopping conflicts, 
but they appear to be a weak basis for subsequent democratization. 
 
• Periods immediately following the cessation of hostilities are those in which 
conflicts are most likely to restart. There is no strong evidence that elections 
diminish the risk that conflicts will restart (Collier et al 2007). There is some 
evidence that rapid democratization in the aftermath of conflict actually 
exacerbates the risk of conflict (Paris 1997); moreover, elections, if indicative of 
initial movements toward democracy in previously authoritarian countries, also 
increase the risk of violence (Hegre et al 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003).  
 
• The ability of democracy to forestall conflict appears to be much weaker in poor 
countries than in rich countries, as the advantage that democracy has in giving 
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people a stake in the system is outweighed by the extent to which democracy 
constrains the ability of governments to fend off challengers militarily (Collier 
and Rohner 2008).  
 
In short, after more than a decade of post-conflict operations, the experience of 
promoting democracy in the aftermath of conflict as a means to an end (ie. to generate a 
more sustainable peace, sustainable post-war reconstruction) has a very mixed record. 
 
Recommendations: 
1. Develop mechanisms other than national elections for generating legitimacy.    
At the national level, consultative forums, as was tried in Afghanistan, 
may do the trick; at the local level, giving people a stake in their own governance 
(and some resources to expend at the community-level in meeting basic needs), 
may be sufficient in advance of full-scale democracy.  That being said, peace, 
order, and basic services do a great deal for generating popular support (as one 
can see with the continued reelection of Museveni in Uganda, even as democratic 
rights are curtailed). 
o Advantages 
 After a state has completely broken down, moving quickly to 
elections makes no sense. It is important to first build 
infrastructure in order to have effective elections.  
 
 Post-conflict elections are dangerous for organizers, 
candidates, voters, and for the stability of the peace process. 
They also jeopardize the concept of democracy from taking 
root. Developing mechanisms other than national elections to 
generate legitimacy is better for all those involved. 
 
 International engagement is inversely proportional to the 
legitimacy of elections. Postponing elections until the state 
has the capacity to support elections on its own will increase 
the legitimacy of elections. 
 
 In post conflict situations citizens often risk their lives to go 
and vote, and they have high expectations about the results of 
those votes. Implementing elections before a state has the 
capacity to meet the expectations of its citizens will result in 
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citizens feeling betrayed and disenfranchised, and this plays 
directly into the hands of insurgents and non-democratic 
groups. 
 
 By quickly implementing elections, we run the risk of having 
a poor leader legitimately elected. It is important to build state 
capacity and create competitive political parties before 
elections are initiated. 
 
 It is not always the case the elections will generate legitimacy. 
In post-conflict societies (particularly in the Middle East) 
citizens are commonly skeptical of elections. They believe 
elections to be a conspiracy of the West to gain power, rather 
than a legitimate process for selecting a government. It is 




o Disadvantages  
 
 In conflict and post-conflict states, sometimes the only way to 
generate legitimacy for a new government is through 
elections. Outside forces cannot just impose democracy, 
citizens will demand to elect their own leaders and the United 
State government needs to be prepared to meet those 
demands. 
  
 It is not necessarily true that elections exacerbate tensions in 
post-conflict states. It is possible to have controlled and 
organized elections that do not increase national tensions.  
 
 Trying to sequence state-building and elections is an 
incredibly hard thing to do, especially when you do not have 
complete control over a situation. Postponing elections only 
increases the risk of an authoritarian coming power. Without 
elections there won’t be democratic legitimacy.  
 
 Elections are the only way to start getting things done. 
Delaying elections interrupts the entire reconstruction 
process. 
 
2. Focus on local elections rather than national elections to generate legitimacy. 
Quickly implementing national elections in post-conflict states can 
undermine democracy by polarizing citizens and empowering spoilers. 
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However, allowing for local elections early on can facilitate democratic 
legitimacy in a country by meeting national demands for elections and 
allowing citizens to participate in the democratic process. Implementing local 
elections can also help to undermine conspiracy theories about the West by 
allowing citizens to have direct control over their local leadership. 
o Disadvantages 
o Implementing local elections does not necessarily increase 
credibility for elections or democracy. In fact, local elections 
can undermine democratic legitimacy by creating local 
governments that do not have the resources or authority to 
accomplish anything, making both the government and the 
election process appear ineffective. This can result in general 
disillusionment with the democratic process. 
 
3. Develop better mechanisms for supporting freedom broadly construed.   
On the economic front, these might include special trade provisions for 
post conflict countries that create the conditions for the growth of an active, 
independent private sector. They might also include efforts to establish property 
rights that could increase local capital as Hernando de Soto has suggested. The 
United States might also place greater emphasis on the protection of basic human 
rights rather than democracy per se.  Assistance could be focused on civil society 
organizations, even, or especially, organizations that have nothing to do explicitly 
with politics. 
o Advantages 
 In post-conflict states, citizen’s perception of the 
government is often negative because it has usually been a 
center of despotism. Even with Western countries patting a 
new government on the back, it is unlikely that citizens will 
quickly begin to trust their government. It is important to 
utilize non-political mechanisms to build state capacity in 
order to gain public support. 
 
4. Establish a system of shared sovereignty 
In post-conflict situations, governments have an overwhelming number of 
tasks to accomplish in order to rebuild their state capacity. While there are some 
things that governments are very good at accomplishing, there are many aspects 
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of the reconstruction process that they are less capable of handling. Allowing 
NGOs to take over some of the tasks that new governments are less equipped to 
handle can take pressure off a new government and help to speed up the 
reconstruction process.   
o Advantages 
 NGOs can compliment the work of the government and 




 Brining in NGOs to supplement government work is an 
untenable and ineffective solution because it will 
undermine state capacity. Allowing NGOs to do the 
work of the government will prevent a new government 




5. Prioritize building state capacity. 
The United States should seek to delay national elections for as long as 
possible and focus instead on enhancing freedom and liberties, while increasing 
state capacity in post conflict environments.  Francis Fukuyama offers a concise 
response to the dilemmas outlined above: “stateness first.” If the research is right, 
civil wars are driven more by the weakness of state governments than the 
repression of autocracies. So in the aftermath of violent conflict, the first priority 
must be to create a government with a “monopoly of legitimate power that is 
capable of enforcing rules throughout the state’s territory” (Fukuyama 2005). This 
means putting elections, at a minimum, and other democracy promotion efforts 
more broadly, on the backburner (although, perhaps, there is a place for basic 
support for media, civil society organizations, and capacity building for the core 
institutions of government). Resources should be channeled instead toward 
necessary investments in activities that increase the power and presence of the 
state in people’s lives: a robust military and police force, investments in public 
goods, and a focus on basic service delivery.  It may also make sense to recognize 
state power where it exists, such as in Somaliland and Puntland. If groups are 
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capable of bringing order to a given territory, that may provide the basis for a 
sustainable transition – a transition that could be up-ended by international 
attempts to facilitate a negotiated solution (Herbst 2000). 
 
Having individuals within the government who are dedicated to state-
building in post-conflict situations is fundamental to our ability to better handle 
these situations. The U.S. government can radically improve its ability to conduct 
state-building by narrowing its priorities. The focus should be establishing 




 Rule of law in post-conflict environments is fundamentally 
under-resourced; the civilian capacity is non-existent, the 
United States government does not fund it, nor do they 
prioritize it. Having an organization focused on state building 
would ensure that rule of law would be prioritized in post-
conflict situations. 
 
6. Improve US capacity to plan and respond to post-conflict situations. 
The US government is not organized to deliver ‘whole of government’ 
assistance to other states, and this assistance is often the coordinated and 
integrated program that complex post-conflict states most need. There is a need 
for an integrated legal construct defining the roles, missions, functions, and 
responsibilities of the U.S. government in post-conflict operations. Such a 
construct would embody the consent of the Congress in that it would be a 
legislative act, and it would provide clear benchmarks for periodic oversight and 
review of assistance programs, perhaps in a process similar to the Quadrennial 
Defense Review, but without overly militarizing the rest of the USG.  Resources 
would have to be made available to other executive branch departments, agencies, 
and even field missions to enable them to participate effectively in this process, 
and the process itself would serve to direct the allocation of the additional 
resources provided.  The planning process should be streamlined by realigning the 
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various regions, bureaus, and Unified Commands into a single coherent system 
for managing global and regional issues.  While implementation would naturally 
change from administration to administration, at least the outlines of the process 
and the roles and missions of the institutional players would be codified in law.   
 
The U.S. government also needs a common operating picture for post-
conflict assistance.  Something similar to the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 
process should be implemented to provide baseline assessments and data for use 
in developing, evaluating, and coordinating policy options both within the 
Government and in public.  The post-conflict NIE would be used to measure the 
appropriateness of programs and methods and the effectiveness of assistance 
implementation.  The public outputs of the process would be used to build and 
maintain political consensus and support both at home and abroad for programs 
that must be maintained over decades  
 
7. Enhance US capacity to strengthen state functions in post-conflict 
environments. 
If “stateness first” is the goal, recent experience has made abundantly clear 
that the U.S. is not equipped to deliver on this mission. Many efforts by outsiders 
to building the capacity of transitional governments yield little in the way of 
improvements in service delivery, instead resulting in huge corruption scandals 
that lead governments to be thrown out (ie. the SLPP in Sierra Leone after an 
extended UN mission) or require ever increasing amounts of outside oversight (ie. 
the Governance and Economic Management Program in Liberia which mandated 
foreign co-signatories on government accounts!). 
 
The current thinking in Washington is that this problem can be addressed 
by making new investments in a civilian rapid response capacity that brings 
together professionals with expertise in post-conflict issues and has them 
organized, readily deployable, and armed with lessons learned from past 
experiences to take up the challenge of state-building missions. There is 
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something to this plan, and it is hard to imagine that such investments would 
make things any worse.  However, any civilian reserve corps would be deployed 
only for a limited amount of time. 
o Advantages 
 Civilian groups currently lack the funding and personnel to 
carryout state-building missions; therefore, these tasks often 
become the job of the DOD because it has far more resources 
and capacity to deal with these situations. Investing in a 
civilian rapid response capacity would remove the job of state-
building from the shoulders of the DOD and place it in the 
hands of professional experts. 
 
 
8. Establish greater coherence and clear authority in USG post-conflict activities. 
Because of its central role in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Department of 
Defense is playing an ever more prominent role in state-building missions. This 
has led to the creation of new authorities and programs for specific contexts 
(Section 1206 for counter-terrorism, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Iraq, Afghanistan), and a 
broader recognition of the need for security, stabilization, transition, and 
reconstruction (SSTR) to be a core mission of the U.S. military with dedicated 
personnel and resources. 
 
However, the balance between DOD and civilian engagement in post-
conflict operations is not quite right. Security is a key aspect of building states, 
but building public infrastructure, delivering services, and finding ways to 
empower communities are also essential pieces of the puzzle. Because DOD sits 
on the resources and assets, it has quickly emerged as the key player within the 
PRTs and with the CERP program, leaving State and USAID to play secondary 
roles. But such instruments have disadvantages as well: they are often 
disconnected from strategic goals, they sometimes sacrifice long-term goals in 
service of immediate needs, and the investments often yield little or no 
measurable impact. In most contexts, post-conflict security operations will be led 
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by the UN or by other lead countries – thus putting U.S. civilian agencies in the 
lead in providing policy direction and channeling resources. 
 
The Bush administration made some attempts to enhance the role of 
civilian agencies in post-conflict operations (through the creation of the State 
Department Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization).. Without, 
however, the command of budgetary resources, personnel, or hard assets, a State 
Department Coordinator is hard-pressed to exercise any authority or leadership. 
There is a pressing need to re-imagine the civilian side of the U.S. foreign policy 
architecture, providing it with the authorities, resources, and staff capacity it 
needs to meet these challenges, among others.  
o Advantages 
 The DOD is an excellent source for trained labor to assist 
experts in post-conflict situations; however, they cannot be 
expected to do everything on their own. The DOD does not 
have a great deal of experience in state-building and 
democracy promotion. There needs to be more civil capacity 
and legislative guidance to direct the DOD in post-conflict 
situations. 
 
9. Consider Alternative Paths for State Building and Service Delivery 
A willingness to explore more dramatic alternatives to state-building may 
also be required. Government might contract out sovereignty over specific areas 
of state activity to what Paul Collier has called independent service providers 
which could organizations / corporations. GEMAP and the Regional Assistance 
Mission for the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) are examples of this kind of initiative.   
 
The design of such arrangements would benefit from further thinking and 
experimentation. Is an international bureaucracy the right way to build capacity 
for service delivery? Should NGOs and private companies be put in competition 
to bid for contracts to deliver basic services? To whom should they be 
accountable? But these ideas go far beyond a corps of ready professionals; they 
require that policymakers stand ready to re-envision how post-conflict aid is 
delivered and how much responsibility is vested in transitional governments.  
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These questions are being explored by the Partnership for Democratic 
Development which has been established under the auspices of the OECD and 
UNDP and includes both OECD and non-OECD states. 
 
Given that the involvement of external actors can break the relationship 
between a government and its own citizens consider allocating foreign assistance 
directly to the citizens of a country rather than to the government. 
 
Consider making membership in international organizations including the 
IFIs conditional on a state’s behavior.  This would mean that the international 
community would have to be willing to abandon a state even after investing 
resources to stabilize a post-conflict environment.  
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A DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCITON AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
The issue of reforming democracy assistance cannot be tackled effectively without 
rethinking the entire foreign assistance business.  The F process was an effort to do this 
within the authorities of the Secretary of State.   Any more comprehensive effort will require 
consideration of the funding levels, authority over the disposition of funds, and more 
extensive organizational reform. 
 
Recommendations: 
1. The next president should establish a new Department of International 
Reconstruction and Development. The head of this new department should be a 
member of the Cabinet.  
It is absolutely crucial that this department be, and be perceived as, 
autonomous from both the Department of State and the Department of Defense. 
The mandate of this new department would be very different from the traditional 
missions of the military and diplomacy. Its central purpose would be to nurture 
improved governance, economic development, and democratic consolidation. 
This separation of departments to fulfill different missions will help each to 
deepen expertise in its respective field, and also clarify to the outside world which 
arms of the U.S. government are doing what. 
 
All foreign assistance resources currently funneled through other agencies 
and departments, with the exception of military training and assistance, should be 
transferred to this new department.  When the U.S. government does provide 
direct assistance to a foreign government through this new department, it must be 
firmly conditioned on pursuit of development objectives.  There will be situations 
in which the United States has a national security interest in providing an 
autocratic regime with military aid or antiterrorist assistance, but this aid must not 
be called democracy assistance or development aid. 
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This new department would largely absorb USAID, the State 
Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, PRM, DRL, and 
INL, DoD post-war reconstruction operations, rule of law training programs 
currently housed in the Department of Justice, agricultural aid now located in the 
Department of Agriculture, Treasury technical assistance programs and primary 
authority over relations with IFIs, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation.     
 
At the same time, this new department should not be responsible for 
providing democracy assistance (or other forms of assistance) targeted at 
nongovernmental organizations.  To the extent possible, the U.S. government 





 A new department would elevate development and the creation of a 
world of effective democracies/responsible sovereigns as a primary 
objective of American foreign policy  
 
 This department would reconstitute a body of technical experts in the 
US government concerned with the promotion of development and 
democracy 
 
 A new department could increase funding for civilian activities 
 
 A Department of International Reconstruction and Development could 
help to create a coherent budgeting and implementations structure 




 A new department could detach development aid from the broader 
objectives of American foreign policy 
 
 A Department of International Reconstruction and Development 
would complicate coordination with the activities of the Defense and 
State Departments and this could make strategic planning much harder 
 
 It could leave development as an orphan without firm support from 
members of Congress  
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 A new department will not guarantee that democracy and development 
programs with get more attention or funding. 
 
 It is highly unlikely that a Department of International Reconstruction 
and Development will be created because it would require entirely 
restructuring the foreign aid program so it is probably not worth 
pursuing. 
 
 Creating a Department of International Reconstruction and 
Development will be very costly and it is not likely that either of the 
two new presidential candidates will be willing to spend what little 
money they have on this. We need to think of other more realistic 
solutions. 
 
 Creating a new department or organization to address every new 
problem is not an effective way of developing. We need to work to 









4. Establish clearly defined goals 
The U.S. government needs to create more clearly defined democracy and 
development objectives. This administration has agreed that democracy promotion is 
in the best interests of the United States, but it needs to establish a clearer set of 
objectives for its overall policy. Once the U.S. government has established a specific 
policy framework, then it will be far more successful at creating programs to support 
that policy.  
 
5. Develop more regional knowledge 
The State Department has become increasingly risk averse. No one wants a 
U.S. dollar to get into the hands of someone who could be corrupt and this has 
narrowed our ability to engage with the world. The State Department used to be very 
good at gathering intelligence and identifying allies, however, they have become less 
successful at this. The State Department needs to start to rebuild its regional 
knowledge and expertise in order to create more effective policies. 
o Advantages 
 Learning about what our goals are in certain countries and how much 
influence we have in certain regions is key in determining the most 
effective means for promoting democracy. 
 
 
6. Empower and modernize the State Department and USAID 
The core problem limiting the U.S. government’s ability to promote 
democracy and development abroad is that most of its programs are hopelessly 
outdated. In order to help them modernize, more funding needs to be channeled to 
both the State Department and USAID. In addition, both organizations need to 
establish better recruitment procedures and incentives in order to draw in new 
talent (including personnel from abroad).  
 
7. Implement the Advancing Democratic Values Act 
 43
The Advancing Democratic Values Act would institutionalize and require 
democracy liaisons to be present in all regions. This act could be used by future 
administrations to protect democracy promotion activities in all regions. 
 
